This paper examines monetary policy responses to oil price shocks in a small open economy that produces traded and non-traded goods. When only labor and oil are used in production and prices are sticky in the non-traded sector the behavior of ination, the nominal exchange rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depends crucially upon whether the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher for the traded or non-traded sector. If the ratio is smaller (higher) for the traded sector then a policy that fully stabilizes non-traded ination causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate) and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise (fall) when there is a surprise rise in the price of oil. Similar results can hold for a policy that stabilizes CPI ination. Under a policy that xes the nominal exchange rate, non-traded ination rises (falls) if the ratio is smaller (larger) for the traded sector. Analytical results show that a policy of xing the exchange rate always produces a unique solution and that a policy of stabilizing non-traded ination produces a unique solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised more than one-for-one with rises in non-traded ination. A policy that stabilizes CPI ination, however, produces multiple equilibria for a wide range of calibrations of the policy rule.
Introduction
A search of the recent literature turns up a number of papers written on how policy makers should respond to oil price shocks, including but not limited to Leduc and Sill (2004) , Dhawan and Jeske (2007) , Plante (2009a) , and Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) . With almost no exceptions this work makes use of models suited for a large developed country, such as the United States. For policy makers from small open economies who may be concerned with nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates, and trade balances, there is a dearth of results available. This is true despite the fact that many small open economies are heavy users of oil products and hence are vulnerable to oil price shocks in the same way that large economies are.
In this paper I address this issue by developing a continuous time, small open economy model that can be used to investigate the performance of dierent specications of monetary policy when the price of oil changes. The economy is small, fully integrated into world capital markets, and uses labor and oil to produce both traded and non-traded goods. Prices are sticky in the non-traded sector so that monetary policy may have important real eects on the economy. To my knowledge this is the rst paper in this area of work that uses a dynamic general equilibrium model that contains traded and non-traded goods.
Using this model I consider the performance of three dierent specications of monetary policy. The rst is an ination targeting policy that stabilizes the ination rate of prices in the non-traded sector (non-traded ination). The second policy considered is an ination targeting policy that stabilizes CPI ination. The third policy xes the nominal exchange rate through intervention in the foreign exchange market. I present both analytical and numerical results regarding the behavior of the model's variables under each policy and analytical results which show the conditions under which each policy generates a unique solution.
The main results are the following. First, I show that whether the ratio of the cost share of oil to labor is higher in the traded or non-traded sectors is crucial to pinning down the behavior of many of the model's variables. For example, under a policy that successfully stabilizes non-traded ination around its target level it is possible for the nominal exchange rate to appreciate or depreciate and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise or fall depending upon the ratios. If the ratio is higher in the non-traded sector then a rise in the price of oil causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise. If the ratio is lower for the non-traded sector then the opposite occurs. For certain calibrations of the monetary policy rule, a similar result holds for the policy that stabilizes CPI ination. Under a policy of xed exchange rates, the response of non-traded ination is pinned down by the ratio and rises (falls) when the ratio is higher (lower) in the non-traded sector.
The intuition behind these results is that the oil price shock may have asymmetric eects on costs (and hence ination) in the traded and non-traded sectors. A policy of stabilizing non-traded ination works by osetting any changes in cost in the non-traded sector by properly adjusting the nominal exchange rate over time. But since costs may rise or fall in the non-traded sector (holding the exchange rate xed) this policy may bring about nominal exchange rate appreciation or depreciation. Similar intuition explains the results for the xed exchange rate policy. Under this policy the nominal exchange rate is not used to change costs in the non-traded sector and consequently ination rises (falls) when costs rise (fall) in the non-traded sector.
I also derive analytical results that show under what conditions these policies produce a unique solution. The results show that a policy that xes the nominal exchange rate always produces a unique solution while a policy which stabilizes non-traded ination produces a unique solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised by more than one-for-one with movements in non-traded ination. Under a policy that stabilizes CPI ination, however, multiple equilibria occur for a wide range of calibrations for the policy rule. The analytical results show that the weight of the non-traded good in the CPI is very important in determining what areas of the parameter space produce indeterminacy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the details of the model and the solution procedure. Section 3 presents the results. Finally, the paper concludes in section 4.
The Model
The model is a continuous time, perfect foresight model of a small, open economy. The economy is small in that it is a price-taker with regards to the traded good and oil products.
Economic activity on the household side is controlled by a representative agent who derives utility from traded and non-traded consumption goods and dis-utility from providing labor to the traded and non-traded sectors. The agent has access to a domestic currency, a domestic nominal bond, and tradable real bond. Money is motivated by assuming that holdings of real money balances provides utility to the agent. On the production side, the traded and non-traded goods are produced using oil and labor. The traded good is produced by a representative rm operating under perfect competition while the non-traded good is an aggregate of dierentiated products produced by a continuum of rms operating under monopolistic competition.
As far as notation is concerned, dX is the dierential of the variable X,Ẋ is the time derivative of X, X o is the steady state value of X, andX is the log-dierential of X, i.e. X = dX X .
Prices
The traded good is the numeraire and sells domestically at a price of eP t , where e is the nominal exchange rate and P t is the world price of the traded good in dollars. The nominal exchange rate measures the number of units of domestic currency per 1 dollar and the rate of depreciation is χ =ė e .
For convenience I assume that P t is constant and equal to 1 so nominal variables are deated by e. In general, nominal variables are denoted with a tilde while their real versions are not.
The nominal price of the non-traded good is given byP n , with an ination rate of
The relative price of the non-traded good is denoted as P n and is controlled by the dierential equationṖ n = P n (π n − χ) .
(1)
Real wages are denoted as W n and W t for the non-traded and traded sectors, respectively.
The dollar price of oil in world markets is denoted as P o .
Two ocial measures of prices are also used here. The rst is the Consumer Price Index (CPI),P CP I , which in this model is also equivalent to the core CPI as households do not directly purchase oil products. The other is the GDP deator,P GDP . The formulas used to calculate these are given later.
The Agent's Optimization Problem
The agent's instantaneous utility function is of the form
aggregates non-traded consumption goods C n and traded consumption goods C t to produce an aggregate measure of consumption, C. The parameters τ , σ c , and µ are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded consumption goods, and the wage elasticity of labor supply, respectively. Total labor sup-
t is the amount of labor provided to the traded sector and I simplify the utility function by replacing C with its indirect utility version. This is done by solving for the Marshallian demand functions of C t and C n and substituting them back into C, i.e. maximizing C subject to the constraint that C t + P n C n = E, where E is real aggregate consumption expenditure. After this is done the term representing utility from consumption is
The functional form for the utility function implies that the exact equation for P CP I is
CPI ination is therefore
where γ n is the share of non-traded consumption out of aggregate consumption spending.
Real wealth is given by
where b * is holdings of the tradable real bond and b is real holdings of a nominal bond traded domestically. The real ow constraint for the agent is given bẏ
In the budget constraint T is lump sum transfers from the government, Π n is rebated prots from the non-traded sector, r * is the real interest rate paid on the tradable bond, and i is the nominal interest rate paid on the domestic bond.
The agent's problem is to maximize
subject to equations (4) and (5). Dening λ 1 as the multiplier on the ow constraint, the rst order conditions for the household's problem can be written as
The rst order conditions for E and m are standard. The rst order condition for b provides a no-arbitrage condition that sets the domestic nominal interest rate i equal to the world real interest rate plus the rate of depreciation. Equations (10) and (11) set the foregone utility lost from working more in each sector equal to the respective benet of working more in that sector. As labor is intersectorally mobile and wages are exible, combining these equations gives the condition that
Since the two are equal at all times I simply refer to the real wage as W . The remaining equation then reads
This equation pins down the aggregate labor supply decision of the agent as a function of the marginal utility of income and the real wage. Finally, the rst order condition for A gives the condition thatλ 1 = 0 for all t as ρ = r * .
Production
Production in the traded sector is done by a representative rm operating under perfect competition. Technology in this sector is
where σ t is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil and b 1 is a distribution parameter. The real unit cost function for this technology is
The factor demands for labor and oil are given by
and
respectively.
Production in the non-traded sector is done by a continuum of rms operating under monopolistic competition. Each rm produces a dierentiated good, Q n (i), which it sells for
where σ n is the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor and b 2 is a distribution parameter. Costs for the non-traded rm, denominated in dollars, is
Note that as φ n is costs denominated in dollars. Costs denominated in terms of the nontraded good are therefore given by φ n
I assume that the dierentiated goods are aggregated into a nal non-traded good, Q n , by a representative rm operating under perfect competition. This rm uses the technology
, where θ n is the elasticity of substitution between the various goods. The zero prot condition for the representative rm implies that the demand for good i is
and that the price index isP
Prices for the individual rms,p(i), are sticky according to setup similar to Calvo (1983) .
Each rm i resets its price when it receives a stochastic signal to do so. The signal follows a Poisson process with an average waiting time of 1 ω , so that ω can be calibrated to control the degree of price stickiness. I also assume that prices grow at rate equal to the steady state level of ination. This ensures that the markup in steady state is only aected by the degree of substitutability between the goods, θ n , and not the steady state rate of ination or other factors. Readers interested in more details or derivations regarding this are referred to Plante (2009b) .
Given that a rm receives a signal to reset its price, the rst order condition forp(i) is found by solving the prot maximization problem,
The rst order condition is
I impose a symmetric equilibrium so that each rm that has the opportunity to choose its price chooses the same price,p * . After imposing the symmetric equilibrium and performing a good deal of algebra, linearizing the rst order condition around a steady state produces an equation that governs the evolution of π n , Aggregation is done linearly across rms. Equation (21) aggregated gives
where ∆ n is a state variable measuring price dispersion in the non-traded sector,
Aggregation of equations (19) and (20) gives the aggregate demand for labor and oil,
It can be shown that the law of motion for ∆ n iṡ
where p * =p * P n . A rst order approximation of this equation giveṡ
which shows that ∆ n is irrelevant for the paths of the variables to a rst order.
Gross Domestic Product
The use of intermediate inputs means that GDP is not equal to the sum of gross output in the traded and non-traded sectors. I calculate real GDP, Q g , as
The GDP deator,P GDP is calculated as the ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP, and GDP deator ination is π GDP =˙P GDP P GDP .
The Public Sector
The public sector consists of the central bank and the scal authorities, hereafter simply the government. The balance sheet of the central bank is
where M d is the domestic component of the nominal money supply and b * g is ocial holdings
of the tradable bond. The growth of the money supply is given bẏ
The consolidated government budget constraint iṡ
For all cases considered here I assume that T passively adjusts to clear the government budget constraint.
Market Clearing in the Non-Traded Sector
Total output must equal total spending on the non-traded consumption good. The market clearing condition in the non-tradable sector is therefore
Note that output in the non-traded sector is demand determined so it adjusts to meet demand for the consumption good.
The Current Account
In equilibrium 
If one makes use of the market clearing condition for the non-tradables sector this reduces
This equation simply states that the economy accumulates foreign assets whenever the sum of income from production of the traded good and foreign investment is greater than spending on traded goods.
The Price of Oil
I work under the assumption that shocks to the real price of oil are persistent, but temporary, in nature. Following a surprise shock the price returns monotonically to its steady state level
Calibration
The model is calibrated to an initial steady state. A table at • Price Stickiness in the Non-traded Sector (ω) The average life of a price is 1 ω . The empirical evidence suggests a range between one to two quarters using disaggregated data but a longer life for more aggregated models. I choose a value of 2 so that on average prices are reset every half year.
• Elasticity of substitution between non-traded goods (θ n ) The value of θ n controls the steady state markup of price over marginal cost in the non-traded sector.
The calibrations for this parameter are all over the map so there is no one accepted calibration. I choose a value of 12 so that the markup is small but not negligible.
• Speed of Adjustment of Oil Prices (α) Estimates for this parameter exist for monthly and quarterly data. Pre 1986 data suggest a value between .95 and 1 for the corresponding AR(1) coecient while post-86 data suggest a value around .80. This corresponds to a range for α between .20 and 0. I choose the conservative value of .10.
• Elasticity of substitution between oil and labor (σ t and σ n ) Although empirical evidence for these elasticities for traded and non-traded sectors is non-existent, these parameters can be calibrated to match the price elasticity of oil demand for rms. A variety of studies using more aggregated data suggest that these elasticities are generally small, reecting the diculties of substituting for oil products in the short run. Given the sparsity of data, I set σ t = σ n to keep the two sectors symmetric in this regard and use a value of .50.
• Spending on oil by rms in the traded and non-traded sectors (P considered. As I explain later these two calibrations provide cover the two possible cases with regards to the ratio of the cost shares that was discussed in the introduction.
Solution Method
I solve the model by deriving the core dynamic system of dierential equations, the variables of which vary depending upon the policy considered. I then perform a rst order linearization around the initial steady state and solve the dierential equations using standard techniques.
In all cases I check to ensure that a solution exists and that it is unique. The model is saddled with a unit root and to get around this when solving the model numerically I assume that r * is a function of the debt-GDP ratio of the economy,
This adds a small negative eigenvalue to the dynamic system instead of the 0 eigenvalue.
Results
Before considering specic policies I rst derive some analytical results that hold regardless of the policy in place. Recall that the real unit cost functions for the traded and non-traded sectors are, respectively,
Costs in the traded sector are equal to unity and constant. By taking the total derivative of the equation for φ t one can therefore solve for how W changes as a function of the change in the real price of oil. Doing so givesŴ
where ζ t o and ζ t l is the cost share of oil and labor, respectively, in the traded sector. Taking the total derivative of the equation for φ n and using the result for the change in W gives one the change in φ n ,
where
and the terms ζ n o and ζ n l are just the cost shares for the non-traded sector.
Whether φ n rises or falls depends upon the sign of η, which is determined entirely by whether or not the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher in the traded or non-traded sector. If the ratio is higher in the traded sector then η is negative and φ n falls when the price of oil rises. If the ratio is smaller in the traded sector then φ n rises whenever the price of oil rises. The intuition behind this result is that when η is negative the drop in W is large enough to oset the increase in the price of oil so φ n falls. In the case when η is positive the drop in wages is not large enough to oset the rise in the price of oil and φ n rises.
With these results in hand it is possible to begin thinking about the behavior of ination in the non-traded sector because the linearized dierential equation governing π n is a function of dφ n − dP n . AsP n is pre-determined at any point in time the initial change in P n will always beP n = −ê. It is through this mechanism that monetary policy can aect ination in the non-traded sector. The reason this is true is that changes in the nominal exchange rate aect the domestic price of oil that the non-traded rms must pay vis-a-vis the price of the non-traded good. If the domestic currency appreciates (depreciates) then the cost of oil drops (rises) in terms of the price of the non-traded good. This does not matter for the rm in the traded sector because the price of the traded good varies directly with the nominal exchange rate. This will be the driving factor in many of the results that follow.
Stabilizing Non-Traded Ination
The rst policy I consider is one where the central bank focuses on stabilizing the ination rate of the non-traded good, π n . To implement the policy I assume that the central bank publicly announces that it will adjust the nominal interest rate according to
As the nominal interest rate is the monetary policy target, the nominal supply of money passively adjusts to clear the money market and the nominal exchange rate oats. The core dynamic system of the model under this policy consists of equations (1), (12), and (25) for the jump variables P n , λ 1 , and π n , and equations (33) and (34) In the true model where r = r * , or assuming that dr is negligible and can be ignored, it is possible to derive some very useful analytical results for this policy. In particular, it is possible to show the conditions under which the policy produces a determinate solution and to also produce some results about the behavior of π n , P n , and several other variables on the transition path. This is possible because under this policy the system of linearized dierential equations for π n , P n , and P o form a subsystem that can be solved independently of the other equations in the model.
The procedure for deriving the sub-system is as follows. The rst order condition for b, equation (9), gives the interest rate parity condition. When linearized this equation shows
Combining this with a linearized version of the monetary policy rule in equation (39) gives
Making use of this result and the previously derived equation for dφ n one can write the system of linearized equations for P n , π n , and
The coecient k1 is always positive but k2 may be greater than, equal to, or less than 0 depending upon whether or not η is negative, zero, or positive.
The roots of the sub-system are r 1 = −α,
Under an ination targeting policy both π n and P n are jump variables so if the system is to have a unique solution there must be 1 negative eigenvalue and 2 positive eigenvalues.
The rst root is always negative so it remains to show under what conditions the last two roots are positive. I presume rst that the only relevant values of α π are those greater than 0. Under that condition we can see that r 2 <=> 0 as α π <=> 1, with the possibility of an imaginary root if α π is large enough. Given this we can rule out any value of α π ≤ 1 as a possible candidate. For r 3 , close inspection reveals that that root will always be greater than 0 for α π > 0, with the possibility of an imaginary root for large enough values of α π .
In other words, the condition under which this policy produces a unique solution is exactly the condition found in the standard closed economy New Keynesian model, namely α π > 1.
Making use of the eigenvector associated with r 1 the solution for the variables along the transition path is,
where h1 is the initial surprise jump in the price of oil.
The solution for π n gives us two useful pieces of information. First, notice that for a given calibration that the deviations of π n from its target become smaller and smaller as α π becomes larger and larger. This applies to both the initial jump and along the entire transition path.
In other words, how much ination varies on the transition path depends directly upon how strongly the central bank announces it will respond to a rise in ination. Second, the direction of the initial jump in π n is entirely determined by the sign of η, operating through k2. If η is positive then k2 is negative and non-traded ination jumps up. If η is negative then k2 is positive and non-traded ination jumps down.
The initial jump in the relative price depends upon both the solution just derived and the change in the relative price across steady states. For the simple model considered here, however, we can ignore the latter issue because the change across steady states is 0. 2 As with π n , the direction of the initial jump and the evolution of P n on the transition path is determined solely by the sign of η. For cases when η is positive P n initially rises and then declines monotonically on the transition path. If η is negative then P n falls initially and rises monotonically on the transition path. AsP n is initially xed, this means that the nominal exchange rate appreciates in the former case and depreciates in the latter case. The magnitude of the initial jump is also sensitive to the value of α π . In the limit as α π goes to innity the coecient collapses to θ n θ n − 1 η.
The intuition behind the results for π n and P n is simple. In order to keep π n close to its 2 Since the shock is temporary wages do not change across the steady state and hence neither does φ n . Using the rst order condition forp(i) one can then show that P n does not change across steady state. target φ n P n must remain nearly constant when the price of oil rises. As discussed earlier, the change in W is pinned down in the traded sector and this then pins down the change in φ n , which may increase or decrease depending upon the sign of η. But the nominal exchange rate can adjust instantaneously to adjust P n . For example, if η is positive then wages do not fall enough to oset the rise in the price of oil so φ n rises. In this case the nominal exchange rate must appreciate so as to reduce the cost of purchasing oil for the non-traded rms. The relative price of the non-traded good rises and this keeps φ n P n nearly constant.
The opposite results hold when the η is negative. In this case the nominal exchange rate depreciates, which raises costs in the non-traded sector by just the right amount to keep non-traded ination very close to its target.
Given the results for π n it is possible to derive results for some of the other variables, as
well. The path of π n pins down the entire path of χ and π
Under this policy both the rate of depreciation and CPI ination vary directly with π n along the transition path.
It is also possible to link up the behavior of π n , i, and what I will refer to as the non-traded real interest rate, r n . To see where r n comes from, imagine that the agent had access to a bond indexed toP n . This bond would have a real return of r n and the nominal interest rate on this bond would be
A no-arbitrage condition would ensure that i n = i along the transition path so
which shows that so long as α π > 1 then the policy ensures that non-traded real rate rises whenever non-traded ination rises above its steady state value. This is similar to the result that holds in closed economy New Keynesian models, except that in that in that case there is only one real interest rate. The no-arbitrage condition also implies that for cases where π n is kept close to its target that i must be adjusted to vary with r n . Importantly, the exact manner in which i must be adjusted depends upon η and so it is not always true that interest rates need to be raised to stabilize π there is an osetting depreciation of the currency. Under the same exact specication of monetary policy, it is now the case that P n , χ, r n , and i initially fall and then rise over time.
As the relative price of the non-traded good is temporarily lower than that of the traded good, output and consumption of this good decline less than what occurs under the case where η is positive.
Stabilizing CPI Ination
In practice central banks focus on stabilizing an ination variable other than π n , generally CPI ination, so it is worthwhile considering the implications of this type of policy. I assume that the central bank implements this policy by adjusting the nominal rate according to the
which is exactly the same as the rule found in equation (39) except that π n is replaced with
As with the policy of stabilizing π n it is possible to derive analytical results about the conditions under which this policy delivers a unique solution and analytical results about the behavior of some of the variables along the transition path. This is true because under this policy it is again possible to derive a sub-system in P n , π n , and P o separate from the other equations of the model.
The procedure for deriving the sub-system is basically the same as before. The linearized versions of the monetary policy rule, the equation for CPI ination, and the interest-parity condition can be combined to give an equation for χ of the form
As before, use this equation in the linearized equation for P n . Once this is done one again has a set of linearized dierential equations for P n , π n and P o that are functions of these three variables alone.
There are two jump variables in the subsystem so there must be two positive roots if there is to be a unique solution. The main result here is that this policy can produce multiple equilibria in the economy for a wide range of calibrations for α π . The roots of the subsystem in this case are
From the equation for r 2 we can immediately see that there will be trouble depending upon the value of α π (1 − γ n ). For cases where α π < 1 1−γn , r 2 will be positive with the possibility of a complex root. If α π > 1 1−γn then r 2 will be negative and there will be multiple equilibria. This can be seen by noting that the rst term in the square root will be positive in this case and since we are adding a positive number to ρ 2 we are guaranteed a negative root. Under the borderline case where α π = 1 1−γn , r 2 explodes to complex negative innity and we also have indeterminacy.
It is possible to give a clear explanation of why this occurs by looking at the behavior of χ, i, and r n . The solution for χ shows that in cases where the policy produces an indeterminate solution χ varies inversely with π n . Substituting the equation for χ into the equation for CPI ination gives
which shows that the change in χ is enough to force CPI ination to also vary inversely with π n . Substituting the equation for dπ CP I into the linearized monetary policy rule one has
and using this in the equation for r n one gets
.
From these two equations we can see that a rise in π n leads to a fall in both i and r n . But if the intuition carries over from other models the drop in r n spurs further increases in π n which, through the policy rule, spurs further decreases in χ, i, and r n . When α π (1 − γ n ) is greater than 1 the policy creates a response that allows self-fullling expectations to drive the economy. Note that when α π (1 − γ n ) is less then 1 then these self-fullling expectations can not occur because a rise in π n brings about a rise in r n and this prevents ination from spiralling out of control.
In cases where there is a unique solution, the solutions of the three variables on the transition path are
where h1 is again the initial surprise jump in the price of oil. So long as α π (1 − γ n ) < 1, the direction of the initial jump in ination is determined by the sign of η and the magnitude is a decreasing function of α π (1 − γ n ). In particular, in the limit as α π (1 − γ n ) approaches 1 the initial jump approaches 0. Since this can only occur if there is a very specic response from the nominal exchange rate this implies that for this calibration the policy will behave very closely to the one where the central bank fully stabilizes π n .
The equations are, unfortunately, too complicated to be able to derive any more analytical results so I now turn to numerical simulations. I avoid the indeterminacy problem by calibrating α π to 1.99, which is near the indeterminacy boundary for calibration used here.
This also implies that the monetary authority stabilizes CPI ination to the greatest extent possible.
The impulse response functions for the baseline calibration are shown in gure 3. Because a calibration of α π = 1.99 is successful at stabilizing π n close to its target level the results are very similar to the ones found in gure 1. Given the similarities of the results for these two policies I refer the reader to the previous section for a discussion about them. For brevity's sake, I do not display the response functions for the alternative calibration, since these will mirror closely the results found in gure 2.
A Crawling Peg
While the number of economies that completely x their exchange rates are few, many countries still occasionally intervene in foreign exchange markets. This section provides results for the polar case where the nominal exchange rate is completely xed, as opposed to the ination targeting schemes where the nominal exchange rate was completely free to oat. Under a crawling peg χ is the monetary policy variable, the nominal exchange rate is pre-determined at any point in time, and real money balances adjusts through the capital account. I assume for simplicity that χ is set equal to its steady state level χ o . In order to defend the peg the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market whenever necessary using its stock of foreign exchange reserves b * g . The core dynamic system of the model under this policy consists of equations (12) and (25) for the jump variables λ 1 and π n , and equations (1), (33), and (34) for the state variables P n , k, and P o , where k = b * + b * g .
As with the ination targeting policies it is possible to derive analytically the conditions under which this policy produces a unique solution and also some analytical results for several variables when r = r * . Under this policy the system of equations for P n , π n , and P o can be written as
, where k1 and k2 are the same as before. The three eigenvalues are
In this case P n is a state variables so a unique solution requires two negative eigenvalues. It is obvious that both r 1 and r 2 will always be negative for realistic calibrations of ω so this policy always generates a unique solution in the subsystem. Interestingly enough, this policy produces a unique solution even though r n falls when ination rises because the policy does not create a feedback eect that leads to self-fullling expectations.
After solving for the eigenvectors one can show that along the transition path
where h1 is again just the initial jump in oil prices and
Note that the sign of h2 is determined entirely by the sign of η through the term k2.
These solutions are more complicated than in the previous cases and do not lead to many easily interpretable solutions. But after performing some algebra it can be shown that the initial jump in non-traded ination is
While it is not possible to sign the initial jump for all possible values of the deep parameters, so long as ω is greater than α, a likely case, the jump in ination is pinned down by the sign of η, with ination rising immediately if η is positive and falling if η is negative. With the nominal exchange rate xed variations in φ n are not immediately oset by movements in P n . Therefore costs rise or fall, depending upon the sign of η, and rms oset this by raising or lowering their prices, which leads to non-traded ination rising or falling.
Several other solutions are available. With χ and r * xed di = 0 at all times. Therefore
Under a xed exchange rate policy the non-traded real interest consequently falls whenever non-traded ination rises. Also, the change in CPI ination is simply
so CPI ination varies directly with non-traded ination.
As before, more comprehensive results can only be had by solving the model numerically.
The impulse response functions for the baseline calibration are shown in gure 4. The rise in the price of oil raises φ n but since e is xed this brings about an immediate rise in non-traded ination. Over time rms adjust to the temporarily high cost of oil by raising their prices, which causes the relative price of the non-traded good to rise over time. The fact that P n is temporarily lower than what occurs under the ination targeting policy manifests itself in a higher level of Q n , initially. As P n rises, however, the agent reduces consumption of the non-traded good, which shows up as a rapid decline in Q n over the rst year. Figure 5 shows the results for the alternative calibration of the model. When η is negative the rise in oil prices now reduces φ n which in turn causes π n to drop initially and for P n to fall over time, while r n initially rises.
Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to examine monetary policy responses to oil price shocks in a small, open economy with traded and non-traded goods as opposed to the large, closed economy model that has been the mainstay so far. This change allows one to consider issues with exchange rates and relative prices that are necessarily ignored in the closed economy models.
The main result in this paper is that because of the asymmetric eects a rise in the price of oil has on costs in the traded and non-traded sectors it is possible for the same specication of monetary policy to produce very dierent behavior in ination, the nominal exchange rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depending upon the cost shares of oil and labor in the two sectors. Under the assumptions made in the paper the behavior of wages is While this paper has produced a number of useful and interesting results, the model used is simple and highly stylized and future research could expand upon the model in several ways. One useful line of work would be to introduce further frictions in the model, such as sticky nominal wages or less then full labor mobility between the two sectors. A second line of work would be to add a second country and make endogenous the foreign variables of the model. While this would be a signicantly more complicated model it would allow for greater realism and a much wider range of questions that could be investigated than with the simple model used here. 
